

**CSE 610 Special Topics:
System Security - Attack and Defense for
Binaries**

Instructor: Dr. Ziming Zhao

Location: Frnczk 408, North campus

Time: Monday, 5:20 PM - 8:10 PM

Today's Agenda

1. Return-oriented Programing

History of ROP

- This technique was first introduced in 2005 to work around 64-bit architectures that require parameters to be passed using registers (the “borrowed chunks” technique, by Krahmer)
- In CCS 2007, the most general ROP technique was proposed in “The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)”, by Hovav Shacham

The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)

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September 5, 2007


Abstract

We present new techniques that allow a return-into-libc attack to be mounted on x86 executables that calls *no functions at all*. Our attack combines a large number of short instruction sequences to build *gadgets* that allow arbitrary computation. We show how to discover such instruction sequences by means of static analysis. We make use, in an essential way, of the properties of the x86 instruction set.

1 Introduction

We present new techniques that allow a return-into-libc attack to be mounted on x86 executables that is every bit as powerful as code injection. We thus demonstrate that the widely deployed “W \oplus X” defense, which rules out code injection but allows return-into-libc attacks, is much less useful than previously thought.

“In any sufficiently large body of x86 executable code there will exist sufficiently many useful code sequences that an attacker **who controls the stack** will be able, by means of the return-into-libc techniques we introduce, to cause the exploited program to **undertake arbitrary computation.**”



2017

The test-of-time award winners for CCS 2017 are as follows:

- **Hovav Shacham:**

The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86). Pages 552-561, In Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2007, Alexandria, Virginia, USA. ACM 2007, ISBN: 978-1-59593-703-2

Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications

RYAN ROEMER, ERIK BUCHANAN, HOVAV SHACHAM, and STEFAN SAVAGE,
University of California, San Diego

We introduce *return-oriented programming*, a technique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior in a program whose control flow he has diverted, without injecting any code. A return-oriented program chains together short instruction sequences already present in a program's address space, each of which ends in a "return" instruction.

Return-oriented programming defeats the W@X protections recently deployed by Microsoft, Intel, and AMD; in this context, it can be seen as a generalization of traditional return-into-libc attacks. But the threat is more general. Return-oriented programming is readily exploitable on multiple architectures and systems. It also bypasses an entire category of security measures—those that seek to prevent malicious computation by preventing the execution of malicious code.

To demonstrate the wide applicability of return-oriented programming, we construct a Turing-complete set of building blocks called gadgets using the standard C libraries of two very different architectures: Linux/x86 and Solaris/SPARC. To demonstrate the power of return-oriented programming, we present a high-level, general-purpose language for describing return-oriented exploits and a compiler that translates it to gadgets.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection

General Terms: Security, Algorithms

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Return-oriented programming, return-into-libc, W-xor-X, NX, x86, SPARC, RISC, attacks, memory safety, control flow integrity


ACM Reference Format:

Roemer, R., Buchanan, E., Shacham, H., and Savage, S. 2012. Return-oriented programming: Systems, languages, and applications. *ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.* 15, 1, Article 2 (March 2012), 34 pages. DOI = 10.1145/2133375.2133377 <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2133375.2133377>

1. INTRODUCTION


The conundrum of malicious code is one that has long vexed the security community. Since we cannot accurately predict whether a particular execution will be benign or not, most work over the past two decades has focused instead on preventing the introduction and execution of new malicious code. Roughly speaking, most of this

(32-bit) Return to functions with one argument?



(32 bit) Return to multiple functions?

Finding: We can return to a chain of unlimited number of functions



ROP

Chain chunks of code (gadgets; not functions; no function prologue and epilogue) in the memory together to accomplish the intended objective.

The gadgets are not stored in contiguous memory, but ***they all end with a RET instruction or JMP instruction.***

The way to chain them together is similar to chaining functions with no arguments. So, the attacker needs to control the stack, but does not need the stack to be executable.

RET?

x86 Instruction Set Reference

RET

Return from Procedure

| Opcode | Mnemonic | Description |
|--------|-----------|--|
| C3 | RET | Near return to calling procedure. |
| CB | RET | Far return to calling procedure. |
| C2 iw | RET imm16 | Near return to calling procedure and pop imm16 bytes from stack. |
| CA iw | RET imm16 | Far return to calling procedure and pop imm16 bytes from stack. |

Description

Transfers program control to a return address located on the top of the stack. The address is usually placed on the stack by a CALL instruction, and the return is made to the instruction that follows the CALL instruction.

The optional source operand specifies the number of stack bytes to be released after the return address is popped; the default is none. This operand can be used to release parameters from the stack that were passed to the called procedure and are no longer needed. It must be used when the CALL instruction used to switch to a new procedure uses a call gate with a non-zero word count to access the new procedure. Here, the source operand for the RET instruction must specify the same number of bytes as is specified in the word count field of the call gate.

The RET instruction can be used to execute three different types of returns:

Are there really many ROP Gadgets?

X86 ISA is dense and variable length

ROPGadget

1. Git clone <https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget> on your box or VM.
2. Install capstone (sudo pip install capstone **or** sudo pip3 install capstone)
3. Python **or** python3 ./ROPgadget.py --binary binaryname

ROP

- Automated tools to find gadgets
 - Pwntools
 - ROPgadget
 - Ropper
- Automated tools to build ROP chain
 - ROPgadget
- Pwntools

ret2libc: code/overflowret4 32-bit (./or4nxc)

```
int vulfoo()
{
    char buf[30];


    gets(buf);
    return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    vulfoo();
    printf("I pity the fool!\n");
}
```

Use "echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space" on
Ubuntu to disable ASLR temporarily


ret2libc: code/overflowret4 32-bit (./or4nxnc)

```
000011ed <vulfoo>:
 11ed:f3 0f 1e fb    endbr32
 11f1: 55                push %ebp
 11f2: 89 e5            mov  %esp,%ebp
 11f4: 53                push %ebx
 11f5: 83 ec 34        sub  $0x34,%esp
 11f8: e8 64 00 00 00    call 1261 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.ax>
 11fd: 05 d7 2d 00 00    add  $0x2dd7,%eax
 1202: 83 ec 0c        sub  $0xc,%esp
 1205: 8d 55 d0        lea -0x30(%ebp),%edx
 1208: 52                push %edx
 1209: 89 c3            mov  %eax,%ebx
 120b:e8 70 fe ff ff    call 1080 <gets@plt>
 1210: 83 c4 10        add  $0x10,%esp
 1213:b8 00 00 00 00    mov  $0x0,%eax
 1218: 8b 5d fc        mov  -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
 121b:c9                leave
 121c:c3                ret
```



ret2libc: code/overflowret4 64-bit (./or464nxnc)

```
0000000000001169 <vulfoo>:
 1169:  f3 0f 1e fa      endbr64
 116d:  55              push  %rbp
 116e:  48 89 e5        mov   %rsp,%rbp
 1171:  48 83 ec 30     sub   $0x30,%rsp
 1175:  48 8d 45 d0     lea  -0x30(%rbp),%rax
 1179:  48 89 c7        mov   %rax,%rdi
 117c:  b8 00 00 00 00  mov   $0x0,%eax
 1181:  e8 ea fe ff ff  callq 1070 <gets@plt>
 1186:  b8 00 00 00 00  mov   $0x0,%eax
 118b:  c9            leaveq
 118c:  c3            retq
```



amd64 Linux Calling Convention

Caller

- Use registers to pass arguments to callee. Register order (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, etc.) %rdi, %rsi, %rdx, %rcx, %r8, %r9, ... (use stack for more arguments)

code/ret2libc64 64-bit

```
FILE* fp = 0;

int vulfoo()
{
    char buf[4];
    fp = fopen("exploit", "r");
    if (!fp)
        exit(0);


    fread(buf, 1, 100, fp);
    return 0;}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    vulfoo();
    return 0;}
```

code/ret2libc64 64-bit

```
000000000401176 <vulfoo>:
401176: f3 0f 1e fa    endbr64
40117a: 55            push %rbp
40117b: 48 89 e5      mov %rsp,%rbp
40117e: 48 83 ec 10   sub $0x10,%rsp
401182: 48 8d 35 7b 0e 00 00    lea 0xe7b(%rip),%rsi
401189: 48 8d 3d 76 0e 00 00    lea 0xe76(%rip),%rdi
401190: e8 db fe ff ff    callq 401070 <fopen@plt>
401195: 48 89 05 ac 2e 00 00    mov %rax,0x2eac(%rip)
40119c: 48 8b 05 a5 2e 00 00    mov 0x2ea5(%rip),%rax
4011a3: 48 85 c0      test %rax,%rax
4011a6: 75 0a        jne 4011b2 <vulfoo+0x3c>
4011a8: bf 00 00 00 00    mov $0x0,%edi
4011ad: e8 ce fe ff ff    callq 401080 <exit@plt>
4011b2: 48 8b 15 8f 2e 00 00    mov 0x2e8f(%rip),%rdx
4011b9: 48 8d 45 fc    lea -0x4(%rbp),%rax
4011bd: 48 89 d1      mov %rdx,%rcx
4011c0: ba 64 00 00 00    mov $0x64,%edx
4011c5: be 01 00 00 00    mov $0x1,%esi
4011ca: 48 89 c7      mov %rax,%rdi
4011cd: e8 8e fe ff ff    callq 401060 <fread@plt>
4011d2: b8 00 00 00 00    mov $0x0,%eax
4011d7: c9          leaveq
4011d8: c3          retq
```


→ %rsp



code/ret2libc64 64-bit

```
000000000401176 <vulfoo>:
401176: f3 0f 1e fa    endbr64
40117a: 55            push %rbp
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401182: 48 8d 35 7b 0e 00 00 lea 0xe7b(%rip),%rsi
401189: 48 8d 3d 76 0e 00 00 lea 0xe76(%rip),%rdi
401190: e8 db fe ff ff callq 401070 <fopen@plt>
401195: 48 89 05 ac 2e 00 00 mov %rax,0x2eac(%rip)
40119c: 48 8b 05 a5 2e 00 00 mov 0x2ea5(%rip),%rax
4011a3: 48 85 c0      test %rax,%rax
4011a6: 75 0a        jne 4011b2 <vulfoo+0x3c>
4011a8: bf 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%edi
4011ad: e8 ce fe ff ff callq 401080 <exit@plt>
4011b2: 48 8b 15 8f 2e 00 00 mov 0x2e8f(%rip),%rdx
4011b9: 48 8d 45 fc   lea -0x4(%rbp),%rax
4011bd: 48 89 d1      mov %rdx,%rcx
4011c0: ba 64 00 00 00 mov $0x64,%edx
4011c5: be 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%esi
4011ca: 48 89 c7      mov %rax,%rdi
4011cd: e8 8e fe ff ff callq 401060 <fread@plt>
4011d2: b8 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%eax
4011d7: c9          leaveq
4011d8: c3          retq
```

→ %rsp



ROPGadget

- Automated tools to build ROP chain
 - ROPgadget